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What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean? 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1 
 
 Over the past twenty years, scholars have published numerous empirical studies 
of the patterns of decisions of reviewing courts.2 Each of the studies subjected to 
statistical analysis large numbers of decisions in which courts at all levels of the judiciary 
have applied six administrative law doctrines to a wide variety of agency decisions. In 
this article, I will summarize the findings of ten of those studies and attempt to explain 
what they mean to lawyers, judges, teachers, and scholars. 
 In section one, I describe the six doctrines. In section two, I summarize the 
findings of the studies, and address the question: how much does doctrine matter? In 
section three, I address the question: what other factors can explain the patterns of 
decisions? I focus particular attention on two variables that many scholars have studied – 
the political or ideological preferences of the judges, and the composition of panels of 
circuit court judges. In section four, I address the question: is the D.C. Circuit different, 
and if so, why? In section five, I address the question: what do these studies mean for 
lawyers, judges, teachers and scholars? 
 
I. The Six Doctrines 
 
 The doctrine that has been studied the most was announced in the Supreme 
Court’s 1984 opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council: 
 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, 
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.3 
                                                 
1 Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. I am grateful to the participants in a 
work in progress luncheon at George Washington University School of Law for providing helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this essay. I am also grateful to David Zaring for encouraging me to 
complete this project. 
2 David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 2317 (2010); Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, The 
Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (2008) (hereinafter referred to as Miles & 
Sunstein II); William Eskridge & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083 (2008); Kristin Hickman & Matthew 
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235 (2007); Thomas Miles & 
Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (2006)(hereinafter referred to 
as Miles & Sunstein I); Paul Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 Wm. & M. 
L. Rev. 679 (2002); Frank Cross & Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 Yale L. J. 2155 (1998); Orin Kerr, Shedding Light on 
Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. Reg. 1 
(1998); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 
(1997); Peter Schuck & Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L. J. 984.  
3 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). 
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In other parts of its opinion, the Court equated “permissible” with “reasonable.”4 
 Some scholars argue that only the second part of the Chevron test is important.5 
They maintain that the first part of the test has no independent meaning because any 
agency construction of a statute that is inconsistent with congressional intent is, by 
definition, unreasonable. In this view, the Chevron doctrine can be simplified and 
restated as: a reviewing court must uphold any reasonable agency construction of an 
agency-administered statute. 
 Between 1984 and 2000, the Chevron doctrine dominated judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretations. Before 1984, the doctrine the Court applied most 
frequently in reviewing agency statutory interpretations was announced in the Court’s 
1944 opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.:        
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under 
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do 
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case 
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.6 
 The Skidmore doctrine largely disappeared between 1984 and 2000. Most 
scholars and judges believed that it had been displaced by the Chevron doctrine. In 2001, 
however, a majority of the Court resurrected the Skidmore doctrine and held that it, rather 
than the Chevron doctrine, applies to some uncertain category of cases.7 Since 2001, the 
Justices have engaged in a lively debate about the circumstances in which each of the two 
competing doctrines applies.8 That debate indicates that all Justices believe that the 
doctrines differ and that the Chevron doctrine is more deferential than the Skidmore 
doctrine. 
 The third doctrine that has been studied was announced in the Court’s 1983 
opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association v. State Farm Automobile 
Insurance Co.: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied 
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.9 
                                                 
4 Id. at 844. 
5 Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va. L. Rev. 597,599 (2009).  
6 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
7 United States v. Mead Corp. 53 U.S. 218, 231-33 (2001). 
8 For a thorough discussion of the debate, see Lisa Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005).   
9 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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The State Farm doctrine is often described as imposing a duty to engage in reasoned 
decision making, i.e., a court will uphold an agency action if, but only if, the agency 
adequately explains how it reasoned from the language of the relevant statute and the 
available evidence to the conclusions it reached.10 The State Farm doctrine is based on 
the Court’s interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) instructs reviewing courts to apply that standard to 
all agency actions.11      
 There is broad agreement that the Chevron and State Farm doctrines overlap, but 
there is disagreement with respect to the extent of the overlap between the two.12 Some 
scholars believe that step two of Chevron is the same as the duty to engage in reasoned 
decision making announced in State Farm, i.e., a statutory interpretation is “reasonable” 
within the meaning of Chevron step two if, but only if, the agency adequately explained 
why it adopted that interpretation. It follows that a scholar who believes that step two of 
Chevron renders step one irrelevant by subsuming that step sees a complete overlap 
between the two doctrines. 
 The fourth doctrine that has been studied is the substantial evidence doctrine. It 
was originally announced by the Court in its 1938 opinion in Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
NLRB and was qualified by the Court’s 1951 opinion in Universal Camera v. NLRB. 
Combining the critical passages from the two opinions, the Court defined the doctrine to 
require: “[S]uch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion,  .   .  .”13 “tak[ing] into account whatever [evidence] in the record 
detracts from its weight.”14 
 In its original form, the substantial evidence doctrine had a narrower role than the 
first three doctrines. It applied only to agency findings of fact made in formal 
adjudications. Gradually, however, it has taken on a broader meaning. The transformation 
of the substantial evidence test into a broad doctrine of judicial review has taken place 
through three mechanisms. First, while the APA instructs reviewing courts to apply the 
substantial evidence standard only to findings of fact made in formal adjudications,15 
modern agencies use informal adjudication and informal rulemaking to “find” the facts 
that are the predicates for their actions in a high proportion of cases.16 As a technical 
matter, an agency is not required to make findings of fact when it acts through informal 
adjudication or informal rulemaking, but courts require agencies to identify the factual 
predicates for their actions in both contexts.17 Reviewing courts also require agencies to 
                                                 
10 For detailed discussion of State Farm, see Richard Pierce, I Administrative Law Treatise §7.4 (5th ed. 
2010). 
11 5. U.S.C. §706(2)(A). 
12 For discussion of this debate, see Pierce supra. note 10, at pages 218-21.  
13 305 U.S. 197, 2291938). 
14 340 U.S. 474, 488(1951). 
15 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E).  
16 See generally Pierce, supra. note 10, at chapters 7 and 8. 
17 In a rulemaking, the agency must incorporate in its final rule a statement of basis and purpose in which it 
discusses the relationship between the available evidence and the factual predicates for its action. See State 
Farm, 463 U.S. 29. If a party petitions for review of an agency decision taken in an informal adjudication, 
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explain why they have chosen the factual predicates on which they rely. Since the APA 
does not authorize a court to apply the substantial evidence standard for this purpose, 
courts usually use the ubiquitous arbitrary and capricious standard for that purpose. Thus, 
courts regularly refer to the choice between arbitrary and capricious review and 
substantial evidence review as a choice between doctrines that perform the same 
functions.18 
 Second, while the APA authorizes courts to apply the substantial evidence 
standard only to findings of fact made in formal adjudications, some important agency-
specific statutes require courts to apply that standard to all actions agencies take to 
implement the statute, including informal adjudications and informal rulemakings.19 That 
congressional instruction to courts to apply the substantial evidence standard to all 
agency actions and not just to formal adjudications has forced courts to adapt the doctrine 
to the quite different contexts of informal adjudication and informal rulemaking.20 In 
those contexts, agencies are not required to make formal findings of fact based on 
“evidence’ of the type courts usually consider in “hearings” of the type familiar to courts. 
The “evidence” on which the agency relies in informal adjudications and rulemakings 
usually consists of scientific and economic studies contained in a “record” that consists 
solely of written submissions to the agency. As a result, the version of the substantial 
evidence doctrine courts apply in such cases is virtually identical to the version of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard that was the basis for the Court’s opinion in State Farm. 
A court can apply the substantial evidence doctrine to uphold an agency action taken 
through use of informal adjudication or informal rulemaking only by determining 
whether the agency engaged in reasoned decision making, including a statement of the 
agency’s reasons in support of the factual predicates for its action. 
 Third, even in the original context of judicial review of findings of fact made in 
formal adjudications, courts now combine the substantial evidence standard with the 
duty to engage in reasoned decision making announced in State Farm. Thus, courts 
often apply the substantial evidence doctrine as the basis to reject an agency finding 
because the agency has not stated adequate reasons for crediting some evidence and 
discrediting other evidence.21 As one circuit court described the modern version of the 
substantial evidence doctrine in 2007, an agency “must give specific, cogent reasons for 
[its] findings” in the common situation in which there is conflicting evidence in the 
record.22 
                                                                                                                                                 
the reviewing court requires the agency to provide a statement of its reasons for acting that includes a 
discussion of the relationship between the available evidence and the factual predicates for the agency 
action. See LTV Corp. v. PBGC, 496 U.S. 633, 654-55(1990).      
18 E.g., Bangor Hydro-Electric C. v. FERC, 78 F.3d 659,663 n.3(D.C. Cir. 1996).  
19 E.g., 15 U.S.C. §717r. 
20 Initially, courts found this task difficult. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 
467,469(D.C. Cir. 1974). Over time, however, they became comfortable with the process. E.g., American 
Public Gas Ass’n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
21 See cases described in Pierce, supra. note 10, at pages 988-89, 997-99. 
22 Chen. v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797,  801-02 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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 The Supreme Court has recognized that the substantial evidence standard and the 
arbitrary and capricious standard perform analogous functions today.23 The Court also 
has characterized the substantial evidence standard as more demanding than the arbitrary 
and capricious standard.24 Circuit courts and scholars have expressed skepticism that the 
two doctrines actually differ, however.25 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
doctrines rarely, if ever, yield different results.26   
 The fifth doctrine that has been the subject of empirical studies had its origin in 
the Supreme Court’s 1945 opinion in Bowles v. Seminole Rock27 though the Court now 
refers to it by reference to its 1997 opinion in Auer v. Robbins:  
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must 
necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of 
the words is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution 
in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various 
constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which 
becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.…28  
 The Auer doctrine performs the same function as the prior four doctrines 
except that it applies to agency interpretations of rules rather than to agency 
interpretations of statutes. Of course, a court must apply both the Auer doctrine 
and one or more of the other doctrines in the common situation in which the 
agency supports its action based on both an interpretation of a statute and an 
interpretation of a rule.29 
 The sixth doctrine is de novo review. It differs significantly from the other five, at 
least in theory. Each of the other five doctrines instructs a reviewing court to confer some 
uncertain degree of deference on the agency decision the court is reviewing. As the name 
suggests, de novo review refers to an approach to judicial review in which the court does 
not confer any deference on the agency; it resolves the issue before it as if the agency had 
never addressed the issue.30  
II. The Findings of the Studies: Does Doctrine Matter? 
 Most of the studies analyzed patterns of decisions by circuit courts, but two 
analyzed Supreme Court opinions and one analyzed district court decisions. Bill Eskridge 
and Lauren Baer analyzed 1014 Supreme Court opinions issued between 1984 and 
2005.31 They found that the overall affirmance rate was 68.3%.32 Disaggregating the 
                                                 
23 Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162-62 (1999).  
24 E.g., American Paper Institute v. American Electric Power Service Corp. 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983).  
25 See cases discussed in Pierce, supra. note 10, at pages 1020-21. 
26 Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162-63. 
27 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945). 
28 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
29 E.g., Shipbuilders Council v. Coast guard, 578 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2009). 
30 Verkuil, supra. note 2, at 688. 
31 Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1094..   
 5
cases by doctrine, they found the following affirmance rates: Chevron, 76.2%; Skidmore, 
73.5%; Auer, 90.9%; and, de novo, 66.0%.33 The only other study of Supreme Court 
decisions was published by Miles & Sunstein in 2006.34 They analyzed the sixty-nine 
Supreme Court opinions issued between 1989 and 2005 in which the Supreme Court 
invoked the Chevron doctrine.35 They found that the Court affirmed 67% of agency 
actions,36 an affirmance rate approximately 9 per cent lower than the rate Eskridge & 
Baer found for the period 1984 to 2005. Since the period studied by Miles and Sunstein 
overlaps almost completely with the last fifteen years of the period studied by Eskridge 
and Baer, the lower affirmance rate found by Miles and Sunstein implies a decline in the 
Supreme Court’s rate of affirmance in Chevron cases after 1990. 
 Most of the studies analyzed circuit court decisions. Several studies reported rates 
of affirmance in circuit courts when they apply the Chevron doctrine. The findings are 
81.3% in 1985,37 75.5% in 1988,38 65.2% in 1991-1995,39 73% in 1995-1996,40 and 64% 
in 1996-2006.41 The findings are in a narrow range: 64 to 81.3% and do not indicate any 
trend toward more of less deference over time. 
 The studies included several findings with respect to the rate of affirmance when 
courts apply the Skidmore doctrine. They are: 55.1% in 1965,42 60.6 % in 1975,43 70.9% 
in 1984,44 and 60.4% in 2001-2005.45 Again, the range of findings is narrow – 55.1 to 
70.9% and they do not indicate a clear trend toward more or less deference over time. 
 Two studies included findings with respect to the affirmance rate when courts 
apply the substantial evidence doctrine and one included a finding with respect to the rate 
of affirmance when courts apply the State Farm doctrine. The findings are: State Farm 
64% in 1996-2006,46 substantial evidence 64% in 1996-200647 and 71.2% in 2000-
2004.48 The range of findings for the State Farm and substantial evidence doctrines is 
even narrower than the ranges of findings applicable to the Chevron and Skidmore 
doctrines – 64 to 71.2%--and again the findings do not show any clear temporal trend. 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Id. at 1100. 
33 Id. at 1142. 
34 Miles & Sunstein I. 
35 Id. at 825. 
36 Id. at 849. 
37 Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1038. 
38 Id. at 1038. 
39 Cross & Tiller, supra. note 2, at 2169. 
40 Kerr, supra. note 2, at 30.  
41 Miles & Sunstein II at 849.  
42 Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1007. 
43 Id. at 1007-08. 
44 Id. at 1030. 
45 Hickman & Krueger, supra. note 2, at 1275. 
46 Miles & Sunstein II at 776. 
47 Id. at 779. 
48 Zaring, supra. note 2, at 2360. 
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 I have found only one empirical study of district court review of agency decisions. 
Paul Verkuil studied district court decisions that applied the substantial evidence doctrine 
to Social Security disability decisions and district court decisions that engaged in de novo 
review of agency denials of requests for information under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).49 He found that district courts affirmed disability decisions in only 50% of 
cases, while they affirmed agency decisions under FOIA in 90% of cases.50 Those 
findings differed dramatically both from the findings in the studies of Supreme Court 
decisions and circuit court decisions and from the pattern of decisions Verkuil 
hypothesized based on the highly deferential nature of the substantial evidence doctrine 
and the non-deferential nature of de novo review.51 
With one notable exception, the studies suggest that a court’s choice of which 
doctrine to apply in reviewing an agency action is not an important determinant of 
outcomes in the Supreme Court or the circuit courts. The ranges of affirmance rates by 
doctrine are: Chevron – 60-81.3%, Skidmore -- 55.1-73.5%, State Farm—64%, 
substantial evidence—64-71.2%, de novo—66%. All of the ranges of findings overlap 
and doctrinally-based differences in outcome are barely detectable. The one notable 
exception is the Auer doctrine. The Supreme Court affirms agency interpretations of 
agency rules at a much higher rate – 90%--than the roughly 70% rate at which it upholds 
other agency decisions.52 There are no studies of circuit court decisions that apply Auer, 
but the Supreme Court seems to be sending the lower courts an unmistakable if implicit 
message that they should confer extraordinary deference on agency interpretations of 
agency rules. 
The unusually high rate at which the Court affirms agency interpretations of 
agency rules suggests strongly that the Court has rejected John Manning’s sophisticated 
argument against judicial deference to agency interpretations of agency rules.53 The 
Court seems instead to have internalized the traditional common sense reasons in support 
of such deference—agencies are in a much better position than courts to know what their 
rules mean and to understand the functional implications of alternative interpretations of 
their rules. 
The contrast between the findings of the studies of Supreme Court and circuit 
court decisions, on one hand, and the findings in Verkuil’s study of district court 
decisions, on the other, adds credence to Verkuil’s interpretation of his findings. Verkuil 
argued that the stark disparity between the results he hypothesized and the results he 
found suggested the need to study in greater detail the two decision making contexts in an 
effort to identify and to address the institutional flaws that led to such anomalous 
results.54 The studies of Supreme Court and circuit court decision making indicate that 
the norm for the results of judicial review of agency decisions is about a 70% affirmance 
                                                 
49 Verkuil, supra. note 2.  
50 Id. at 719. 
51 Id. at 719. 
52 Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1142. 
53 John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency 
Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996). 
54 Verkuil, supra. note 2, at 724-33. 
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rate. Any study that finds an affirmance rate that varies significantly from that norm in 
some context suggests the need for detailed study of the decision making context to 
identify and to address the causes of the variation from the norm. 
While the studies demonstrate that a court’s choice among the six doctrines has 
little if any explanatory value, it does not follow that doctrine is irrelevant to the decision 
making process if we conceive of doctrine more broadly. In the final section of this essay 
I argue that five of the six doctrines courts apply are just alternative ways of stating the 
same broad doctrine – a court should uphold a reasonable agency action. If we conceive 
of doctrine in that broader way and ignore the subtle differences in the Court’s 
description of the doctrines, the studies provide no direct evidence with respect to the 
explanatory value of doctrine. Through a process of differential diagnosis, however, the 
studies allow us to infer that doctrine is by far the most dominant explanatory variable if 
we conceive of doctrine in this much broader way.   
What Factors Can Explain the Patterns of Decisions? 
If choice of doctrine explains little if any of the variation in the outcome of cases 
in which courts review agency actions, it would be helpful to know what other factors 
help to explain the pattern of decisions. The studies have identified five other variables 
that may help to explain outcomes – procedures used to produce the agency decision, 
agency consistency over time, extent of judicial comfort with the subject matter of the 
agency decision, ideological perspectives of the judges and Justices, and panel effect, i.e., 
whether a circuit court panel consists of three judges of the same political party or of a 
mixture of judges of different political parties. 
The findings with respect to an agency’s choice of decision making procedures 
suggest that this factor has little, if any, effect on the rate of judicial affirmance of agency 
actions. Eskridge and Baer found that the Supreme Court upholds agency actions taken 
through use of notice and comment rulemaking in 72.5% of cases versus 65.4% for 
actions taken through formal adjudication.55 That difference is modest, however, and its 
significance is called into question by some of Eskridge and Baer’s other findings, e.g., 
the Court upholds agency positions taken in amicus briefs and in various informal 
documents at a rate higher than the rate at which the court upholds positions taken in 
legislative rules or formal adjudications.56 Moreover, Elliott and Schuck found that 
circuit courts uphold agency adjudications more frequently than agency rules,57 while 
Kerr found no difference in the rate of affirmance of rules and adjudications.58 
Several studies found that the rate of affirmance is higher with respect to 
longstanding agency positions than for newly adopted agency positions.59 The 
                                                 
55 Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1147. 
56 Id. at 1148. 
57 Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1021-22. 
58 Kerr, supra. note 2, at 30. 
59 E.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1148-49; Hickman & Krueger, supra. note 2, at 1286-87; Kerr, 
supra. note 2, at 33. 
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differences were small, however. Those findings are consistent with applicable doctrine. 
The Court has long said that an agency can depart from precedent or change its policy if, 
but only, if the agency acknowledges and explains the change.60 That aspect of applicable 
doctrine suggests a pattern of decisions like that found in the studies—courts uphold 
longstanding agency positions only slightly more often than they uphold newly adopted 
positions. 
usiness 
regulation where the agency has a distinct expertise advantage over the Justices.  
 in its ability to understand a subject as it gains experience in 
addressing the subject.  
en studied in explaining their votes in cases in which the Court 
reviews agency actions.  
                                                
Several studies found differences in affirmance rates depending on the substantive 
context of the agency decision. Thus, for instance, Eskridge and Baer found that the 
Supreme Court affirms agency decisions involving bankruptcy or business regulation in 
75 to 77% of cases but that it affirms decisions involving criminal law or labor law in 
only 62 to 65% of cases.61 This difference also fits reasonably well with applicable 
doctrine. The Court has long emphasized comparative institutional advantage and 
specialized agency expertise as bases for its deference doctrines.62 It is not surprising that 
it attaches less significance to an agency’s comparative advantage when the agency is 
addressing a subject like labor law or criminal law that is relatively familiar to the 
Justices, than when the agency is addressing a subject like bankruptcy or b
Comparative institutional advantage may explain some of the other findings of 
differences in affirmance rates based on subject matter as well. Thus, for instance, Zaring 
found that the D.C. Circuit affirms agencies that appear before it frequently 12% less 
often than agencies that appear before it less frequently.63 It is not surprising to learn that 
a court gains confidence
Many studies found that the ideological preferences of judges and Justices have 
considerable explanatory power in the context of judicial review of agency actions.64 The 
findings with respect to the voting patterns of the two former administrative law 
professors who are now Justices are illustrative. Eskridge and Baer found that Justice 
Breyer votes to uphold 79.5% of liberal agency actions, while Justice Scalia votes to 
uphold only 53.8% of liberal agency actions.65 That 25.7% difference suggests strongly 
that the ideological preferences of the Justices are far more important than any of the 
other factors that have be
 
60 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)(agency need only assert its belief that 
new policy is better than old policy to have new policy upheld); INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26,32 (1996) (court 
will overturn an unexplained departure from precedent). See generally Pierce, II Administrative Law 
Treatise §11.5.   
61 Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1144. 
62 E.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 97, 103 (1983). 
63 Zaring, supra. note 2, at 2366. See also Miles & Sunstein II at 796-97 (finding that courts that review an 
agency more frequently uphold the actions of that agency less frequently).  
64 Zaring was the only scholar who looked at this question and did not find a significant difference in voting 
patterns based on the ideological preference of judges. Zaring , supra. note 2, at 2362-64.   
65 Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1154. 
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Eskridge and Baer found a smaller disparity between the votes of Justices Breyer 
and Scalia when the Court reviews conservative agency actions. Justice Scalia votes to 
uphold such actions in 71.6% of cases, while Justice Breyer votes to uphold them in 
64.9% of cases – a difference of only 6.7%.66 The difference between those two voting 
patterns reflects another robust finding in the studies. Liberal judges and Justices vote to 
uphold agency actions more often than do conservative judges and Justices.67 This 
finding also illustrates the insignificance of doctrine. Justice Scalia is the most outspoken 
proponent of the highly deferential Chevron doctrine,68 while Justice Breyer is the most 
vocal critic of that doctrine.69 Yet, Justice Breyer’s voting pattern shows that he is more 
deferential than Justice Scalia. Justice Breyer votes to uphold agency actions more often 
than any other Justice, while Justice Scalia votes to uphold agency actions less often than 
any other Justice.70 
Every study of circuit court decisions that has looked at the question has found 
that ideological preferences help to explain patterns of decisions in cases in which courts 
review agency actions. Most studies found large ideologically-based differences in 
outcomes. Remarkably, three of the studies had identical findings with respect to the 
explanatory power of the ideological preferences of judges. Each of the three found that a 
circuit court panel was 31% more likely to uphold an agency action when the action was 
consistent with the ideological preferences of the members of the panel than when the 
action was inconsistent with those preferences.71 Thus, ideology is by far the most 
important of the explanatory variables that have been studied. 
Many studies also analyzed the patterns of decisions in an effort to detect a panel 
effect, i.e., a difference in patterns of decisions that varies depending on whether a panel 
consists of three judges of the same political party or instead consists of two judges of 
one party and one judge of the other party. Every study found large panel effects. Again, 
three of the studies included remarkably consistent findings with respect to panel effects. 
The tendency of circuit judges to vote in a manner consistent with their ideological 
preferences is about half as strong when judges sit in politically mixed panels as when 
they sit in politically unified panels.72 
Scholars have identified two plausible reasons for the panel effect. It may be 
attributable to a whistle-blower effect, i.e., the members of the majority party are deterred 
from voting in accordance with their ideological preferences by fear that their colleague 
                                                 
66 Id. at 1154. 
67 E.g., Miles & Sunstein I, at 855; Miles & Sunstein II, at 796.  
68 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511 
(1989) (praising Chevron). 
69 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363 
(1986)(criticizing Chevron). 
70 Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1154; Miles & Sunstein I at 826. 
71 Miles & Sunstein I, at 856; Miles & Sunstein II, at 789-90; Cross & Tiller, supra. note 2, at 2171. See 
also Kerr, supra. note 2, at 40 (finding a 20% differential based on ideology); Revesz, supra. note 2 (finding 
large ideologically-based differences in every time period studied). But see Zaring, supra. note 2, at 2362-
64 (finding only small ideologically-based differences). 
72 Miles & Sunstein I, at 856; Miles & Sunstein II, at 789-90; Cross & Tiller, supra. note 2, at 856.  
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of the other party will write a scorching dissent that will embarrass them.73 Alternatively, 
it may be attributable to the effects of collegiality, i.e., when judges with differing 
ideological preferences are forced to discuss their differences they tend to temper their 
views.74  
I suspect that the panel effect is caused by some combination of both factors. 
Whatever may be its cause, the effect seems to disappear when the number of decision 
makers increases from three to nine. Ideology is about as important a determinant of the 
decisions of the Justices as it is of circuit court judges even though the nine Justices differ 
significantly with respect to their ideological preferences and the majority can be certain 
that its opinion will elicit a highly critical dissent in every case that has significant 
ideological content.75  
IV. Is the D.C. Circuit Different? 
Every study that has looked at the question has found that the D.C. Circuit is less 
deferential to agencies than any other circuit. That robust finding is important because the 
D.C. Circuit decides far more cases involving judicial review of agency action than any 
other circuit. The D.C. Circuit decides over one-quarter of cases in which circuit courts 
review agency actions.76 Like many of the other findings in the studies, the findings with 
respect to the D.C. Circuit’s affirmance rate are remarkably consistent. Schuck and Elliott 
found that the D.C. Circuit affirmed agencies in 12% fewer cases than other circuits in 
1984,77 while Miles and Sunstein found that the D.C. Circuit affirmed agencies in 11% 
fewer cases than other circuits during the period 1996 to 2006. 
There are at least four plausible explanations for the D.C. Circuit’s consistently 
less deferential posture in cases in which it reviews agency actions. First, it might be 
attributable to the D.C. Circuit’s greater familiarity with the subject matter of many of the 
administrative law cases it decides. A regional circuit court might decide one case 
involving telecommunications law every few years, for instance, while the D.C. Circuit 
typically decides several such cases each year. Over time, a judge who is regularly 
exposed to a body of law may come to believe that he does not suffer from a significant 
institutional disadvantage vis a vis the agency charged with responsibility to implement 
that body of law. The judge may come to believe that he need not defer to the agency 
because he knows as much about the subject as do the agency decision makers. This 
explanation for the D.C. Circuit’s less deferential posture fits well with the finding that 
circuit courts have lower affirmance rates with respect to agencies they review frequently 
than with respect to agencies they review infrequently and with the finding that the 
                                                 
73 Cross & Tiller, supra. note 2, at 2173-74. 
74 Harry Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1358-62 
(1998).  
75 See text at notes 64-70 supra. 
76 Miles & Sunstein II, at 794-95. 
77 Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1041-42; Miles & Sunstein II, at 796. 
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Supreme Court affirms agencies less frequently in substantive contexts in which the 
Justices believe that they are not at a comparative institutional disadvantage.78 
Second, the D.C. Circuit’s less deferential posture may be attributable to the 
composition of the court. The process of appointing judges to the D.C. Circuit differs 
markedly from the process of appointing judges to the regional circuit courts. In 
nominating people to be members of regional circuit courts, the President traditionally 
defers to the preferences of the Senators and/or Governor of each state who are members 
of the President’s party. Thus, for instance, when a Democrat President has the 
opportunity to nominate someone to the “Maryland seat” on the Fourth Circuit, the 
President traditionally solicits and acts on the recommendation of the senior (Democrat) 
Senator from Maryland. The D.C. Circuit is one of only three courts to which the 
President can make nominations of people of his own choosing. The process of 
nominating people to the D.C. Circuit is dominated by the President’s political advisors. 
This selection process may yield nominees with unusually powerful political and 
ideological perspectives who are less likely to defer to the (often rival) politicians who 
run agencies. 
Third, the D.C. Circuit’s less deferential posture may be attributable to the 
ambitions of many of the members of the D.C. Circuit. The President often chooses 
members of the D.C. Circuit as nominees for the Supreme Court. Four of the members of 
the current Supreme Court were members of the D.C. Circuit when they were nominated. 
It may be that members of the D.C. Circuit believe that they can improve their chances of 
being nominated to the Supreme Court by deciding high visibility cases in ways that 
coincide with the ideological preferences of the leaders of their party. 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit’s workload may contribute to its less deferential posture. 
The D.C. Circuit decides less than one quarter of the average number of cases per judge 
decided by the other circuit courts.79 It takes a much longer time to read and understand 
the record in a typical administrative law case than in a typical criminal law or contract 
law case. Moreover, it takes much longer to write an opinion reversing an agency action 
than an opinion affirming that action. The D.C. Circuit can devote much more time to 
each case in which it reviews an agency action than can a regional circuit court. This 
explanation for the D.C. Circuit’s greater willingness to overturn agency actions fits well 
with the finding that the D.C. Circuit writes much longer opinions than other circuits in 
such cases.80 
I believe that each of these four factors contributes to the D.C. Circuit’s unusually 
low rate of upholding agency actions. My belief is reinforced by an explanation I once 
heard from a friend who is a member of another circuit. As he described the process his 
court often uses in deciding administrative law cases, he and his colleagues use Chevron 
as a verb. Thus, for instance after a long day of hearing oral arguments in several cases, 
one of which involved review of an agency action, the senior member of the panel would 
                                                 
78 See text at notes 61-63. 
79 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business 2009 41 (2009). 
80 Schuck & Elliott, supra. note 2, at 1004. 
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ask: “Should we Chevron that case?” In most administrative law cases, the other 
members would respond affirmatively for several good reasons. The record in a typical 
agency review case is extremely long. It often includes multiple scientific studies with 
conflicting conclusions with respect to issues that are unfamiliar to the judges. Given 
their heavy load of other cases, the judges can not devote nearly enough time to study of 
the record and the issues to be confident that they understand the issues well enough to 
pass judgment on the adequacy of the agency’s treatment of those issues. They fear that 
they might cause more harm than good by attempting to grapple with the issues in a 
serious way. Finally, they can dispose of the case with relatively little use of scarce 
resources by instructing a clerk to write a short draft of an opinion in which he 
summarizes the facts and issues, recites the applicable doctrines, and assures the reader 
that the court has dutifully applied those doctrines and has detected no fatal flaws in the 
agency’ decision making process. Of course, regional circuit courts overturn about one-
third of the agency actions they review, so the judges must at least take a quick look at 
factors like the relationship between the agency’s legal conclusions and the language of 
the applicable statute and the quality of the agency’s reasoning before they Chevron a 
case.   
My friend went on to express the opinion that the members of the D.C. Circuit 
can take a less deferential attitude toward such cases largely because of their much lower 
caseload. Of course, he might have added that the members of the D.C. Circuit often can 
obtain a decent understanding of the issues in less time than the members of a regional 
circuit court because of their greater familiarity with the subject matter addressed in most 
agency decisions. 
I do not intend my stylized and necessarily hypothetical description of the 
decision making process of either the regional circuit courts or the D.C. Circuit as a 
criticism of either decision making process or of the judges who engage in either process. 
If my description is accurate, it may well be that both institutions are doing about what 
each should be doing given their quite different circumstances. What is clear, however, is 
that the D.C. Circuit is systematically different from the other circuit courts in its 
tendency to be less deferential to agencies. I leave until the last section of this essay, the 
question of what, if anything, we should do about that tendency. 
V. Implications of the Studies 
A. Implications for practitioners 
 The findings of the studies have several implications for practitioners. First, 
lawyers who play roles in administrative law cases should spend less time and energy 
arguing about which doctrine a court should apply, e.g., whether an agency action is 
subject to Chevron deference or Skidmore deference. There is no empirical support for 
the widespread belief that choice of doctrine plays a major role in judicial review of 
agency actions. I am not suggesting that lawyers ignore doctrine completely. There is 
anecdotal evidence that a court’s choice of doctrine can be outcome determinative in a 
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few otherwise close cases.81 Moreover, courts expect to read briefs and listen to 
arguments that include some discussion of applicable doctrine, and it is always a costly 
mistake to fail to meet the expectations of an individual or an institution. It is a waste of 
time and energy, however, to make a lengthy argument about the particular standard of 
review the court should apply to an agency action. 
 Lawyers should focus their arguments instead on the common elements of the 
doctrines, e.g., is the action consistent with the applicable statute and the available 
evidence, and has the agency adequately explained the reasoning process it used?       
Lawyers also should emphasize the consequences of the action under review, e.g., this 
action will have the following [good or bad] consequences. Arguments of that type are 
far more likely to influence a reviewing court than are arguments with respect to the 
particular doctrine that a court should apply to an action.  
Of course, it would be helpful to know the ideological preferences of the members 
of the panel at the time the lawyer drafts a brief, since liberals are likely to find some 
consequential arguments more persuasive than conservatives and vice versa. In most 
cases, however, the lawyer will not know the composition of the panel until after briefs 
are submitted. In that common situation, the briefs should include as many consequential 
arguments as the record can support, preferably including some that are likely to appeal 
to conservatives and some that are likely to appeal to liberals. That will create a situation 
in which the lawyer can emphasize one or the other set of consequential arguments at oral 
argument once he knows the composition of the panel. 
 The findings also suggest that lawyers should put a lot of thought into selection of 
the forum in which to seek review of an agency action in the common situation in which 
the petitioner can choose among several forums. Some courts have a high proportion of 
liberal Democrats, while others have a high proportion of conservative Republicans. The 
findings of the studies indicate that forum selection can be a powerful determinant of 
outcome. Of course, ceteris parabis, the D.C. Circuit is a good choice for a petitioner, 
since it consistently reverses agencies more often than any regional circuit court. 
B. Implications for teachers 
 I have long struggled with the question of how I should treat this subject in my 
administrative law course. I believe that it remains important that I devote considerable 
class time to teaching doctrine because it is the vocabulary all lawyers must master to 
communicate effectively with agencies, courts, and clients. I also believe, however, that 
we owe our students a candid description of the role of doctrine. Thus,  
I feel the need to tell my students about the studies that show that choice of doctrine is 
not an important determinant of the outcome of administrative law disputes.  
                                                 
81 In a few cases, a court has applied Chevron and upheld an agency action when the same court previously 
applied Skidmore and rejected the action. E.g., Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 1993); Satellite 
Broadcasting & Communications Ass’n v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1994).   
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I provide that candid description of the largely inconsequential role of choice of 
doctrine with some regret, however. I fear that my students’ knowledge of the minor role 
that choice of doctrine plays will discourage them from devoting time and energy to the 
study of doctrine and will induce them to resent the amount of course time I devote to the 
study of doctrine. I temper my description of the relatively minor role that is played by a 
court’s choice of a particular doctrine with emphasis on the common elements of the 
competing doctrines. No matter which doctrine a court applies, it invariably looks at three 
factors in deciding whether to uphold or reject an agency action: (1) the relationship 
between the agency action and the applicable statute; (2) the relationship between the 
agency action and the available evidence; and, (3) the quality of reasoning the agency 
used to explain its action.    
 I have even more ambivalence about telling my students about the studies that 
have found that the ideological preferences of judges are an important determinant of the 
outcome of many administrative law disputes. I fear that such a revelation will induce in 
my students a cynical perspective that is not healthy for them either as young lawyers or 
as citizens. I swallow hard and tell them about those findings as well, however, because I 
believe that my overriding duty to them is to be honest in describing the realities of the 
practice of administrative law. At a minimum, I will have provided them with 
information that will allow them to decide whether they want to devote their careers to 
this field, rather than to some other area of law that is less affected by politics. 
 I also temper my description of the findings with respect to the important role that 
politics and ideology play in the decision making process by emphasizing the more 
reassuring inferences we can draw from the studies. If, as the studies suggest, 26 to 31% 
of the votes of judges and Justices can be explained as a function of the ideological 
preferences of the judges and Justices, it follows that 69 to 74% of the votes of judges 
and Justices are unaffected by their ideological preferences. Thus, it is fair to infer that in 
over two-thirds of cases in which courts review agency actions, the court engages in a 
politically and ideologically neutral decision making process in which it focuses on the 
common elements of the competing doctrines: Is the action consistent with the applicable 
statute? Is the action consistent with the available evidence? Has the agency explained 
adequately why it took the action under review?             
C. Implications for courts 
 The Supreme Court should respond to the robust finding that choice of doctrine is 
not an important determinant of the outcome of a review proceeding by simplifying 
review doctrine. I endorse David Zaring’s suggestion that the Supreme Court should 
replace all six of the doctrines that it now applies with one simple doctrine – a reviewing 
court must uphold any reasonable agency action.82 The Court should recognize that it, 
lower courts, lawyers, and scholars are wasting scarce time and energy tilting at 
windmills by arguing about which doctrine applies to a particular agency action.  
                                                 
82 Zaring, supra. note 2, at 2368-69. 
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Every study of the subject has found that choice of doctrine is not an important 
determinant of the outcome of an administrative law dispute. Moreover, the doctrines are 
not mutually inconsistent. The Court can, and should, acknowledge that each of the 
existing doctrines is just a restatement of, and an elaboration on, Zaring’s proposed 
universal test.  
Thus, Chevron step one serves as a reminder that an agency interpretation of a 
statute cannot be reasonable if it is inconsistent with clear legislative intent. It follows 
that both agencies and reviewing courts must attempt to determine what Congress 
intended when it included a particular provision in an agency-administered statute. 
Similarly, the State Farm test is just a reminder that an agency must explain how it 
reached a decision and that a court must review the agency’s reasoning process as part of 
its task of deciding whether the agency action is reasonable. The Skidmore doctrine is a 
similar reminder that courts should consider the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning 
process as part of the judicial task of deciding whether the agency’s action is reasonable. 
The substantial evidence doctrine is just a reminder that one of the tasks of a reviewing 
court is to look at the record of a proceeding to see whether the factual predicates for the 
agency action bear some reasonable relationship to the available evidence. And, of 
course, the Auer doctrine is simply a paraphrase of Zaring’s proposed test transposed to 
the context of review of agency interpretations of agency rules.  
That leaves only the de novo review doctrine. The Court should acknowledge that 
the de novo review doctrine does not exist, and that it never has existed. It would make 
no sense for a court to ignore completely an agency’s reasons for acting as it did, and I 
doubt that any court has actually acted in that irrational matter. Once some other 
institution of government has devoted time and energy to resolution of a dispute, no court 
should ignore that institution’s reasons for resolving the dispute as it did. The studies are 
consistent with common sense. Courts consider an agency’s reasoning for what it is 
worth, whether or not Congress chooses to label the review process de novo.83 
 I believe that adoption of Zaring’s proposal would respond adequately to 
the finding that doctrine is not an important determinant of the outcome of a review 
proceeding. I find it far more difficult to identify a promising response to the troubling 
finding that the ideological preferences of judges and Justices are the most important 
determinant of the outcome of review proceedings. 
I once believed that the Court could reduce significantly the role of politics and 
ideology in the process of judicial review of agency actions by announcing a more 
objective and less malleable doctrine that all courts must apply. For years, I argued that 
Chevron was such a doctrine.84 For a while, I could point to studies that supported that 
argument. The more recent studies do not support my prior view, however. Any 
beneficial effect Chevron once had has now disappeared. I now share the view of many 
scholars that courts will never announce a doctrine that cannot accommodate the 
                                                 
83 See Eskridge & Baer, supra. note 2, at 1142. 
84 E.g., Richard Pierce, I Administrative Law Treatise §3.4 at 148 (4th ed. 2002). 
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powerful tendency of judges and Justices to act in ways that are consistent with their 
strongly held political and ideological perspectives.85 
The findings with respect to the role of panel composition in the review process 
tempts me to urge circuit courts to adopt a practice of assigning a politically mixed panel 
to every review proceeding. The studies suggest that such a practice might cut in half the 
explanatory power of the political and ideological views of judges in the review 
process.86 I am not prepared to make such a proposal at present, however. I fear that 
adoption of such a practice might have unintended adverse effects that would more than 
offset its beneficial effects. In particular, I fear that treating judges as members of a 
political party might reinforce their tendency to think and act as members of a political 
party. 
I am troubled by the D.C. Circuit’s consistently less deferential posture in agency 
review cases, particularly when I factor in the robust finding that a high proportion of 
judicial decisions that reject agency actions are primarily driven by the ideological 
preferences of the judges. It is not healthy for a handful of politically unaccountable 
judges to make a high proportion of the nation’s policy decisions under the guise of 
reviewing actions taken by politically accountable agencies. The only action I can 
suggest that might have a beneficial effect on the D.C. Circuit’s approach to review 
actions is one the Supreme Court has taken on many prior occasions – issuance of a 
unanimous opinion in which the Court chastises the D.C. Circuit harshly for 
misperceiving its role and overstepping the appropriate boundaries of judicial review.87 
There is little evidence that the D.C. Circuit has internalized that message when the Court 
has sent it in strong language in the past, but I can think of no other means of trying to 
keep the D.C. Circuit within permissible bounds. 
D. Implications for Scholars 
 The studies have several implications for scholars. We should spend less time 
engaging in meaningless debates about the alleged differences among the remarkably 
similar judicial review doctrines and about the circumstances in which each should be 
applied. We should focus instead on the three common elements of the doctrines – 
consistency with applicable statutes, consistency with available evidence, and quality of 
agency reasoning. We should also devote more attention to consequential arguments, e.g., 
if the [EPA or FCC] takes the following action, it will have the following [good or bad] 
effects.  
                                                 
85 E.g., Miles & Sunstein I, at 869-70; Sidney Shapiro & Richard Levy, Judicial incentives and 
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 Duke L. J. 1051, 1063-64 (1995).  
86 See text at notes 71-75 supra. 
87 The Court has issued at least three unanimous opinions in which it has criticized the D.C. Circuit harshly 
for exceeding the appropriate boundaries of judicial review. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 845; 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 544-45 (1978); FPC v. Transcontinental 
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1978). See generally Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee, The APA, 
the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345 (1978).           
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Most importantly, we should put more time and effort into the kinds of empirical 
studies I have discussed in this essay. Teachers, scholars, lawyers, agency heads, judges, 
Justices, and legislators need to know what courts do and why. The language courts use 
to describe what they do and why they do it is a useful starting point in that process, but 
empirical studies can provide additional insights into judicial practices that can help all of 
us gain a better understanding of the roles reviewing courts play in the administrative 
state.                                        
                                          
 
 
  
  
 
